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STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of: 
Cache Valley Syndicate Trust Case No. 15396 
Successor to 
Financial Service Co., Inc. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant disagrees with the Statement of Facts of 
the respondent and most of these disagreements are set forth 
in the Statement of Facts in the appellant's original Brief. 
However, the respondent raises an additional issue in paragraph 
two of his Statement of Facts when he alleges that the 
appellant, Elmer Erickson, was determined to be criminally 
culpable in causing losses to Cache Valley Syndicate Trust. 
This is not an accurate statement of facts. Elmer Erickson 
entered a plea of guilty to three separate criminal complaints 
entitled "The State of Utah vs. Elmer Erickson" File Nos. 
18711, 18712 and 23004. The first two complaints were issued 
on the 29th day of August, 1972, and the third complaint was 
issued on the 11th day of February, 1976. Those three complaints 
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alleged that Elmer Erickson obtained money from ind1· 'd 1 · Vl ua], 
·, 
contrary to state law. Elmer Erickson was never charged 
with taking money from Cache Valley Syndicate Trust or 
any other illegal activity pertaining to Cache Valley Synd:l 
cate Trust. 
POINT 1 
THE CLAIMS OF ELMER G. ERICKSON WERE NOT 
BARRED BY ANY COURT ORDER OR PROBATION 
AGREEMENT. 
The appellant strenuously objects to the respond~t 
attempting to embellish the records in the lower court by 
attaching to his Brief copies of court orders and probatic: 
agreements from other criminal actions. If the respondent 
intended these matters to be considered by the court, then 
he should have introduced them in the lower court and then 
designated them as part of the record on appeal in accorda-
with Rule 75 A. The respondent did not do so, and conseqt:j 
said documents should not now be considered by the Suprero; 
Court. 
The respondent contends that the appellant 'is barred 
from filing this appeal and supposedly from maintaini~~ 
action in the lower court for claims he has as a creditor 
or as a beneficial interest holder. This is a positiootl 
was not asserted in the lower court and the record on apV 
clearly demonstrates that the appellant was notified of a 
actions in the lower court and was allowrd to appear a~ 
participate in all hearings in the lower court. The res; 
did not contend in the lO\ver court that the appella~ 
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standing and obviously the lower court felt that the appellant 
had a right to be present, to present evidence and to maintain 
his claim. The very fact that the claims of the appellant 
were given classification by the court supports the lower 
court's belief that the appellant had standings before it. 
The respondent claims that placing the appellant's claim 
in third classification indicated a complete rejection of his 
claim. There is no evidence in the record to demonstrate any 
such position. In fact the respondent does not even attempt 
to support the contention by any reference to the transcript 
or record. This is because he knows there is no evidence to 
support such a position. 
As indicated in the appellant's Statement of Facts on 
pages 4 and 5 of the appellant's Brief, Cache Valley Syndicate 
Trust has filed a lawsuit against the appellant for $92,000, 
and the appellant has filed a Counterclaim for approximately 
$100,000. That case is pending trial at this time. There 
has never been a motion filed asking that the appellant's 
Counterclaim be dismissed because of any previous court orders. 
The respondent has not raised this issue in any lower court 
and he should not be able to raise it for the first time on 
appeal. 
Even if this court were to rule that the respondent may 
raise this issue on appeal, it is clear that the documents 
attached as Appendix A, B and C establish the position of the 
appellant . The court order, Appendix A, and the probation 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.agreement, Appendix C. state that Elmer G. Ericson is to 
assign any beneficial interest he has in Cache Valley Sync1 
cate Trust to individuals who have suffered a loss by reasc 
of his activities. The probation agreement is explicit tha 
this refers to beneficial interest units and not to claims 
that he may have as a creditor. The appellant fully intenc 
to comply with the order. However, he can not comply with 
that order unless he takes reasonable efforts to protect u 
interest represented by his beneficial shares. It is o~k. 
that the court order expects him to preserve these claims t 
the best of his ability so that he can assign some of the 
interest to those individuals that have suffered this loss. 
If the appellant does not comply with the probation agreerro 
the court may find him guilty of a probation violation. 
However, his compliance or non-complaince with the probati( 
agreement should not effect the case now pending before th. 
court. 
It should be noted that there were three criminal act 
filed against Elmer Erickson in Cache County. They were 
entitled "State of Utah vs. Elmer Erickson" File Nos. 1B1L 
18712 and 23004. Elmer Erickson was never charged with ta· 
money from Cache Valley Syndicate Trust, the respondents r.-
Each one of the criminal actions related to obtaining mane 
from individuals. It was these individuals that the court 
wanted to portect with its order. It was not Cache Valle· 
Syndicate Trust. The respondent's statement that hundred· 
individuals had been injured by the appellant's criminal 
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activities is totally unsupported by any evidence whatsoever, 
as are the majority of the other allegations made by the 
respondent in his Brief. 
POINT TWO 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY BONNIE 
ERICKSON'S CLAIM BEING PLACED IN CLASS 
THREE. 
The transcript which is part of the file contains the 
proceedings of two separate hearings. The first hearing was 
on the 12th day of April, 1977. That hearing is covered in 
the transcript from page 1 through page 89. The second 
hearing was on May 23, 1977, and is contained in the tran-
script from page 90 through page 106. On April 12, 1977, 
the court indicated that within thirty (30) days the parties 
should file motions \vith "memorandums or affidavits." (R. 312) 
Thereafter, on May 23, 1977, Robert V. Phillips, one of the 
attorneys for the appellant, asked the court what actions 
would be taken concerning certainty of the claims. Judge 
Christoffersen stated that there would be a further evidentiary 
hearing on the issues that were contested. (T. 105) One of 
those issues was the question of whether or not Bonnie Erickson's 
claim would be placed in class three. The attorneys for the 
respondent had earlier conceded that her claim should not be 
treated the same as Elmer Erickson's. (T. 73) No such 
further evidentiary hearing was held. Consequently, it is 
a contention of the appellant, Bonnie Erickson, that the court 
had no basis to place her in class three since no evidence 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was ever produced by the respondent indicating that she hac 
any involvement in mismanagement of the trust property. 
The respondent sites 9 Am Jur 2d, Bankruptcy, Section 
572 Page 441 apparently in support of his position that it_ 
Bonnie Erickson's burden to prove she was not involved in 
any mismanagement of trust funds. That section does not 
establish that principal, but in fact states that a married 
woman should not be treated any different than any oilier 
creditor by reason of her marital relationship. Counsel 
does not site any authority for the position that it is 
Bonnie Erickson's burden to prove she was not involved in 
mismanagement. It would seem apparant that this is a 
burden borne by the trust if they intend to relegate her 
to an inferior position to that of other beneficial interes-
holders. The respondent does not claim that Bonnie Ericksc· 
did not file a claim with the trust or that it was not time 
Consequently, it is the position of the respondent that Bor: 
Erickson must be treated the same as all other beneficial 
interest holders who have not been involved in mismanageme: 
of trust funds. 
POINT THREE 
THE LOWER COURT HAD NO AUTHORITY TO 
ESTABLISH A PRIORITY BASED UPON AN 
ALLEGED COMMON LAW ASSIGNMENT FOR THE 
BENEFIT OF CREDITORS CREA7ED ON 
NOVEMBER 1, 1971. 
The respondent attempts to avo '-d the terms of the 
Declaration of Trust creatc·d on November l, 1974 by alle\ 
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that in fact said Declaration of Trust was a common law 
assignment for the benefit of creditors. The resondent 
is the only one to ever raise the issue of a common law 
assignment. The Declaration of Trust which is set out in 
its entirity in the recor~ pages 11 through 14,and which 
is cited extensively in the appellant's Statement of Facts 
does not claim to be a common law assignment for the benefit 
of creditors. The introduction paragraph of that Declaration 
of Trust states in part "that we ... entered into an agreement 
to create a trust ... to operate a specific investment as here-
inafter explained by this statement." Paragraph two of that 
Declaration of Trust states in part" ... it is understood 
and agreed that we ... being entitled to the equitable and 
beneficial interest of all profits and property ... " (emphasis 
added) . 
It is clear from the Declaration of Trust that those 
individuals agreeing to be subscribers to said document 
intended that the business be operated in such a manner to be 
profitable. In fact paragraph 13 of said trust states "That 
this trust shall continue for such time as the business 
proves to be profitable, but may be terminated sooner by the 
trustee if he finds it desireable to do so for the best 
ir.terest of the estate and Cestuis que trustents. This trust 
shall terminate twenty-one (21) years after the death of the 
last subscriber of this declaration unless sooner terminated 
by the trustee." It is clear that the trust was created for 
· t and other securities the purpose of dealing 1n proper Y 
-7-
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1 for the benefit of the beneficial interest holders. The 
assignment of trust was not for the purpose of 1 iquidatinc; 
the assets or distributing the proceeds to the creditors 0, 
beneficial interest holders. 
The purpose of an assignment for the benefit of 
creditors, whether at common law or by statute is to liquid, 
the assets and distribute them to the creditors and other 
parties having an interest or claim. This was not the 
purpose of the assignment of trust, nor was this done by t~.­
trustee established by the assignment of trust. The respon. 
attempts to classify the assignment of trust as a common !a. 
assignment for the benefits of creditors because he realiZe' 
that this is the only possible way he can justify the dis: 
but ion which he asks this court to accept. The appellant 
opposes that distribution because the trustee of the assigr.-
ment of trust created in 1971 continued to do business and 
incurred indebtednesses and obligations with new creditors 
while trying to operate the trust at a profit. Having ~M 
so, said creditors are entitled to priority in their clairs 
over and above the beneficial interest holders who signed r 
assignment of trust and agreed to engage in the business. 
The beneficial interest holders and other creditors ic 
existence in 1971 could have elected to proceed with an 
f · f d · t l!owever, when the assignment for the bene ~ t o ere ~ ors. 
did not do so but rather elected to make the trust a profi· 
business, they thereby became obligated to see that the cr• 
ditors dealing Hith suid trust Here first rayed before a~, 
8 
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proceeds were distributed to the beneficial interest 
holders. 
The respondent cites Utah Assn. of Credit Men v. Connell 
as supporting its position that the 1971 assignment of trust 
was really an assignment for the benefit of creditors. That 
case does acknowledge that a common law assignment for creditors 
can be created even though Utah has a statute regulating such 
assignments. However, that case establishes that certain 
formalities must be observed. The assignment in that case was 
a general assignment without preference for the benefit of all 
creditors. All creditors were notified and apparently 
acquiesced or accepted the assignment. The court stated in 
part " ... It is not our purpose nor do we wish to be understood 
as here deciding that in a proper case under the Utah statute 
creditors may not complain of the failure to comply with 
statutory formalities and procedure; but what we do now 
decide is that the case at bar presents in all its phases a 
valid assignment .... " Absolutely no evidence was produced 
in the lower court to demonstrate that the November 1971 
assignment of trust was intended to be an assignment for the 
benefit of creditors or that it complied with any of the 
formalities and procedures necessary to create a valid 
assignment for the benefit of creditors. 
The respondent in his Brief alleges many reasons why 
the court accepted the priority proposed by the trustee. 
However, it should be noted that none of these allegations 
arc supported by references to the transcript or record. 
- 9 -
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The record from the lower court does not give any reason 
for the priority established by the court. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The allegations of the respondent in his Brief are 
unsupported by the record and the transcript of the court 
below and contrary to the provisions of the assignment of 
trust. Consequently, the position of the respondent shoulc 
be rejected and the relief prayed for by the appellant 
granted. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBHITTED this day of September, 191 
BY =R~o=B~E=R~T~A-.~E~CwH~A~R~D~--------
Attorney for Appellant 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoin: 
Reply Brief of Appellant to David R. Daines, N. George Dair 
III, Attorneys for Respondent, 128 North Main Street, Loga: 
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